Corporate Responsibility and the Idea of the Firm by Cranmer, Laurence
Saïd Business School
Research Papers
Saïd Business School RP 2018-10
The Saïd Business School’s working paper series aims to provide early access to high-quality and rigorous academic research. Oxford Saïd’s
working papers reflect a commitment to excellence, and an interdisciplinary scope that is appropriate to a business school embedded in one of the
world’s major research universities.
This paper is authorised or co-authored by Oxford Saïd faculty. It is circulated for comment and discussion only. Contents should be considered
preliminary, and are not to be quoted or reproduced without the author’s permission.
Corporate Responsibility and the Idea of the Firm
Laurence Cranmer
Saïd Business School, University of Oxford
July 2015
Corporate Governance and Organizational Behavior Review / Volume 1, Issue 1, 2017 
 
13 
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND  
THE IDEA OF THE FIRM 
 
Laurence Cranmer * 
 
* Associate Fellow, Saïd Business School, University of Oxford, UK 
Contact details: Saïd Business School, University of Oxford, Park End Street, Oxford, OX1 1HP, UK 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
How to cite this paper: Cranmer, L. 
(2017). Corporate responsibility and the 
idea of the firm. Corporate Governance 
and Organizational Behavior Review, 
1(1), 13-24. 
http://doi.org/10.22495/cgobr_v1_i1_p2 
 
Copyright © 2017 The Author 
 
This work is licensed under the Creative 
Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 
4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 
4.0). 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/b
y-nc/4.0/ 
 
ISSN Online: 2521-1889 
ISSN Print: 2521-1870 
 
Received: 25.07.2017 
Accepted: 02.10.2017 
 
JEL Classification: D21, H32, L2 
 
DOI: 10.22495/cgobr_v1_i1_p2 
 
An appeal to some version of corporate responsibility has become a 
strategic issue for business. Many companies and most global 
corporations make public claims about their corporate 
responsibilities in addition to claims about financial outcomes and 
success. This raises a conceptual question: to what extent, if at all, 
do claims about corporate responsibility have implications for the 
idea of the firm. This paper starts by setting out one version of the 
idea of the firm and its core or traditional responsibilities, and then 
works through a series of possible further responsibilities. Each of 
these further responsibilities is incorporated into the initial version 
in order to understand potential implications for the idea of the 
firm. The argument in this paper does not assume that this initial 
version of the idea of the firm is the only possible version. However, 
given this version and the further dimensions suggested, the paper 
considers the kinds of issues that various claims about corporate 
responsibility raise for the idea of the firm. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
An appeal to some version of corporate 
responsibility has become a strategic issue for 
business. There are many interpretations of this 
idea, but it is unlikely that companies can ignore the 
debate about this issue. Many companies and most 
global corporations make public claims about their 
corporate responsibilities in addition to claims 
about financial outcomes and success. These claims 
range from informal contributions to public debate, 
to responses to issues of public concern, to formal 
reporting on the basis of sets of objectives and 
targets1.  
                                                          
1 One indication of the extent corporate responsibility 
reporting is suggested in the KPMG International Survey of 
Corporate Responsibility Reporting 2011. This finds that, 
‘Ninety-five percent of the 250 largest companies in the 
world (G250 companies) now report on their corporate 
responsibility (CR) activities, two-thirds of non-reporters 
This raises a conceptual question: to what 
extent, if at all, do claims about corporate 
responsibility have implications for the idea of the 
firm. The argument developed in this paper is one 
attempt to address this conceptual question.  
I start by setting out one version of the idea of 
the firm and its core or traditional responsibilities, 
and then work through a series of possible further 
responsibilities2. Each of these further respon-
                                                                                        
are based in the US.’ This suggests that many companies 
do at least make claims about corporate responsibility. The 
nature and depth of the these reports needs to be explored 
further, and is discussed in this KPMG document. In 
addition, examples of corporate responsibility reports (or 
related reports) can be easily accessed on most corporate 
websites, and are collated on websites such as 
http://www.csrwire.com/ 
2 The further responsibilities suggested in this paper are 
drawn from a variety of sources. One public source of the 
kinds of issues that could be considered further 
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sibilities is incorporated into the initial version in 
order to understand potential implications for the 
idea of the firm. 
The argument in this paper does not assume 
that this initial version of the idea of the firm is the 
only possible version, or that the particular 
dimensions of responsibility described here are the 
only possible dimensions. However, given this 
version and these dimensions the paper considers 
the kinds of issues that various claims about 
corporate responsibility raise for the idea of the 
firm, and in particular for the boundaries of the 
firm. The structure of the argument and the specific 
implications of the responsibilities identified can be 
assessed separately; the former may continue to be 
useful even if the latter are disputed or incorrect. In 
addition, the structure of the argument should make 
it possible to change the content or the ordering of 
the specific responsibilities while retaining the 
overall argument. 
This paper does not explicitly distinguish 
between a series of concepts related to the broad 
idea of corporate responsibility including corporate 
social responsibility (CSR), sustainability, and 
corporate citizenship among others. These concepts 
may refer to different aspects of a firm’s 
responsibilities. For example ‘sustainability’ is 
increasingly central to the public claims made by 
firms, and in many cases refers to a specific set of 
primarily environmental responsibilities. The issues 
raised by these various concepts can be discussed 
further.  
The argument developed does not make claims 
about whether the implications discussed are 
desirable, even if the arguments about the 
implications for the firm are accurate. However, the 
argument does aim to open up some of the issues 
that these claims would need to address if any of 
these implications were considered desirable. 
This paper is intended as a contribution to a 
continuing debate and is not a closed argument. It is 
intended to promote a discussion of the adequacy, 
the empirical implications, and the ethical 
implications of the arguments presented, and to 
stimulate further critical analysis.  
 
RESPONSIBILITY AND VALUE CREATION 
 
One way to consider the implications of claims 
about corporate responsibility is to start with a 
widely used means of conceptualising business 
activity: the idea of value creation3.  
On this view the firm can be described as a 
centre of value creation. Firms are organised for the 
production goods and services, typically described 
as products. Firms add value to inputs through a 
                                                                                        
responsibilities is the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)  
https://www.globalreporting.org/Pages/default.aspx 
According to the website, ‘GRI provides all companies and 
organizations with a comprehensive sustainability 
reporting framework that is widely used around the 
world.’ This framework is used as the basis for some of the 
CR reports mentioned above. 
3 One discussion of value creation can found in Michael 
Porter, Competitive Advantage, Simon & Schuster, 1978. 
Porter develops a value chain model of generic activities 
to describe the process of value creation for an individual 
firm. 
transformation process to generate outputs. Value 
creation is measured by the financial return on the 
investment required to produce these outputs. In 
general, a financial return is generated by the firm 
meeting the preferences of its customers to whom 
products are sold. Financial return may be defined 
as profit or, for many companies, a return on 
shareholder investment.  
It may be argued that claims about corporate 
responsibility raise issues beyond the firm. On this 
view, the debate about corporate responsibility may 
change the legal or policy context in which firms 
operate, or the preferences of some investors or 
customers, but not the idea of the firm itself. A 
standard model of value creation remain a central 
means of conceptualising the firm. Ideas about 
wider corporate responsibility inform the debate 
about public policy, regulation and legislation, and 
about the preferences of investors and customers, 
rather than the debate about the nature of the firm 
or the firm’s responsibilities.  
On another view, it may be argued that the 
standard model of value creation can be extended to 
take into account the impact of business activity 
beyond the creation of products measured by a 
financial return. This may involve a wider view of 
business beyond the traditional boundaries of the 
firm’s actions and outcomes, and may involve 
extended timescales for analysing these actions and 
outcomes, including the implications for future 
generations.  
This suggests, but does not of course establish, 
that some wider conception of corporate 
responsibility at least makes sense based on an 
extended view of the standard model of value 
creation. This raises the question of whether this 
wider conception requires a change to the standard 
model of the firm or can be accommodated within 
this standard model. 
 
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE FIRM: AN ANALYSIS OF 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
On the standard model of value creation firms 
generate a financial return through any combination 
of actions and outcomes that are legal within 
relevant jurisdictions.  
This suggests that the actions and outcomes of 
the firm are bounded by two principles: a financial 
principle (F) and a legal principle (L).  
I use the idea of a principle to mean a general 
claim that is appealed to as the basis for multiple 
reasons for acting. Reflection on reasons for acting 
may identify the principles that these reasons are 
based on, and reflection on principles may establish 
consistency or lack of consistency with reasons for 
acting. I suggest that part of the content of a 
principle and of a reason has ethical significance, as 
well as other forms of significance including rational 
significance. The idea of reflective equilibrium is one 
approach to arriving at justifiable reasons and 
principles. I do not develop the arguments about 
these views in this paper, but these can be pursued 
further. 4  
                                                          
4 It is important at this stage to set out this general view about 
what I mean by reasons and principles. This version of my 
view has drawn most recently on T. M. Scanlon, Being 
Realistic About Reasons, Oxford, 2014. As part of a wider 
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We have identified two principles. However, 
firms may have multiple purposes (or aims, 
objectives, missions or similar descriptions) in 
addition to principles F and L. We can make a 
distinction between these purposes and the overall 
principles that set the boundaries of the standard 
model of the firm. On this view the firm pursues its 
purposes within boundaries set by the two 
principles F and L. 
It may be argued that F and L are already 
demanding principles: operating within these 
principles involves significant responsibilities before 
any further responsibilities are proposed. It may be 
also argued that F and L do not fully describe all of 
the responsibilities that firms could accept, and in 
some cases may in fact accept. These views can be 
assessed in the light of the analysis in this paper. 
On this basis, a standard model of the firm may 
be stated as:  
A centre of value creation bounded by a 
financial principle (F) and a legal principle (L) 
This can be simplified as: 
 
1. A centre of value creation bounded by 
F and L 
 
The specific responsibilities under F and L are 
complex. F is relatively informal and depends on the 
market context in which the firm operates, and on 
aspects of L. L is relatively formal. The specific 
responsibilities under L are explicitly codified, 
although subject to judicial interpretation. The 
distinction between informal and formal can be 
developed further.  
For L, we can describe a range of approaches 
for applying each of the responsibilities under L to 
the firm. We can identify an initial three aspects of 
this, although further aspects can be identified.  
First, the firm may apply L through 
understanding both the content of relevant specific 
legislation, and the public policy and ethical 
intentions of this legislation. Or the firm may seek 
to find the least stringent and least demanding 
interpretation of the legislation, and may invest in 
significant research to establish this interpretation 
and to defend it. Many firms operate somewhere 
between these positions. Firms may find that 
meeting F requires an approach closer to the latter, 
however, this may change if, for example, 
                                                                                        
discussion about the more fundamental question, ‘How 
then do we come to know particular non-derivative truths 
about which things are reasons’ (p102) Scanlon suggests 
that, ‘My own answer is that we do this simply by 
thinking carefully about what seem to us to be reasons, 
considering what general principles about reasons would 
explain them, what implications they would have, and 
considering the plausibility of these principles’ (p102). 
Scanlon also discusses, ‘bringing one’s particular 
judgements about reasons and one’s general principles 
about when something is a reason into reflective 
equilibrium’ (p102). This does not do justice to the 
complexity of Scanlon’s arguments, or to the philosophical 
issues that these arguments raise, including how and 
whether Scanlon’s use of reasons and principles is 
consistent with the practical use of these concepts in the 
current paper. However, as a minimum I suggest that this 
approach to reasons and principles is useful as a working 
basis for the analysis in this paper.   
shareholders or consumers expect or require an 
approach closer to the former.  
Second, there are likely to be multiple versions 
of the content of L across jurisdictions. The firm 
may seek to apply a version of L that is consistent 
with the least demanding version of L in the 
jurisdiction from which it originates and across each 
jurisdiction in which it operates, or may seek to 
apply the most demanding version of L that is 
available from each of these jurisdictions. In the 
latter case, the firm may develop internal standards 
that are consistent with the most demanding version 
of L, and apply these standards across all 
jurisdictions.  
Aspects of the latter approach may apply to 
standards of for example health and safety, working 
conditions or pollution. This is may be problematic 
where there is a different substantive content to L. L 
may be based a different ethical intention across 
jurisdictions, for example in employment laws in 
relation to women. It may also be problematic where 
L reflects a context in which it may be difficult to 
apply the most demanding version of L, for example 
in rates of pay. A strategy that includes global 
outsourcing or relocation of some or all operations 
to relatively low wage economies is based on 
differences in pay rates, among other factors. The 
firm may consider it to be very demanding to apply 
the highest wage rates across all jurisdictions. This 
could also apply to differential pay rates across 
regions of a single jurisdiction such as the UK. 
Third, the firm may seek the most demanding 
or the least demanding versions of the range of 
requirements that constitute international law 
including treaties, charters, and other agreements. 
The nature and status of international law is more 
complex and contested than national law, and the 
various requirements may be open it greater 
interpretation. Some of the issues raised for the first 
two aspects will also apply to international law 
requirements.  
The aspects of L discussed so far suggest that 
firms may adopt a spectrum of views about L from a 
maximal to a minimal view. On this basis the 
standard model of the firm may be revised as: 
 
2. A centre of value creation bounded by F  
and a maximal or minimal view of L 
 
The two principles included in (1) describe the 
responsibilities of the firm using the standard 
model5. Further ideas about corporate responsibility 
                                                          
5 This is a simplification or idealisation of a ‘standard model’ 
of the firm. For example, the UK Companies Act 2006 sets 
out the ‘general duties of directors’. This includes the 
following as part of the, ‘Duty to promote the success of 
the company’: ‘A director of a company must act in the 
way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to 
promote the success of the company for the benefit of its 
members as a whole, and in doing so have regard 
(amongst other matters) to - (a) the likely consequences of 
any decision in the long term, (b) the interests of the 
company's employees, (c) the need to foster the company's 
business relationships with suppliers, customers and 
others, (d) the impact of the company's operations on the 
community and the environment, (e) the desirability of the 
company maintaining a reputation for high standards of 
business conduct, and (f) the need to act fairly as between 
members of the company.’ http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ 
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may add further dimensions to this view, and can be 
described as extending the range of actions and 
outcomes of the firm beyond those measured by a 
financial return (F), and beyond those that are legally 
required, allowed or prohibited (L)6. 
This may result in an extended view of 
corporate responsibility that is open-ended 
compared to the standard model of the firm. In the 
standard model value creation (which itself may 
involve significant indeterminacy) is constrained by 
the requirement to generate a financial return legally 
through the production and sale of products.  
To describe further corporate responsibilities 
we can begin with the following claims, each of 
which depends on wider considerations than those 
typically considered of direct relevance to the firm. 
This is an illustrative list and is not exhaustive: 
 Extending the relevant preferences beyond 
customers who purchase products to include 
other individuals and communities (often 
described as stakeholders) affected by the firm’s 
actions and outcomes. This is a stakeholder 
principle (SH)  
 Extending the relevant scope of outcomes to 
include a range of environmental impacts 
beyond legally required, regulated or prohibited 
impacts (e.g. pollution) or where no relevant 
legal constraints apply (e.g. some aspects of 
carbon emissions). This includes outcomes that 
may be described as externalities. This is an 
environmental principle (EN) 
 Long term conceptions of value that cannot be 
easily measured by a financial return, in 
                                                                                        
ukpga/2006/46/part/10/chapter/2 I cannot offer a legal 
reading of this part of the Act, but it does appear to 
suggest a wider view of a director’s responsibilities than 
might be assumed by statement (1) in this paper. 
6 One way amongst others of describing much of the 
literature on corporate responsibility is the attempt to 
work out the implications of these further responsibilities 
for the firm. One example is the article Creating Shared 
Value, Michael Porter and Mark Kramer, Harvard Business 
Review, January 2011. This develops an interesting 
approach and argues that, ‘The concept of shared value 
can be defined as policies and operating practices that 
enhance the competitiveness of a company while 
simultaneously advancing the economic and social 
conditions in the communities in which it operates.’ The 
article suggest that, ‘Shared value holds the key to 
unlocking the next wave of business innovation and 
growth. It will also reconnect company success and 
community success in ways that have been lost in an age 
of narrow management approaches, short-term thinking, 
and deepening divides among society’s institutions.’ At 
the same time, ‘Shared value focuses companies on the 
right kind of profits—profits that create societal benefits 
rather than diminish them.’ It suggests that, ‘The moment 
for an expanded view of value creation has come’ and 
that, ‘We need a more sophisticated form of capitalism, 
one imbued with a social purpose. But that purpose 
should arise not out of charity but out of a deeper 
understanding of competition and economic value 
creation. This next evolution in the capitalist model 
recognizes new and better ways to develop products, 
serve markets, and build productive enterprises.’ There 
are a range of complex issues here. I am not yet sure about 
whether this ends up with a view of the firm that has 
changed the ‘standard model’ as defined in statement (1) or 
is an expanded version of this model.   
particular where this includes meeting the 
preferences of future generations. This is a long 
term principle (LT)  
 Considering the specific context within which 
the firm operates such as the alleviation of 
extreme poverty, the requirements of 
indigenous communities, or impacts on 
particularly vulnerable or valuable natural 
environments. This aspect differs from the 
claims described above because it may only 
apply in specific contexts. This is a specific 
extended principle (SE) 
We can describe these claims as adding further 
principles for the firm based on the idea of value 
creation.  
In each case the principles may be refined 
further. For example, the stakeholder principle (SH) 
may include considerations relevant to the proper 
treatment of individuals (a human rights principle, 
HR) and those relevant to the flourishing of the 
wider community of which these individuals form a 
part (a community development principle, CD)7.  
The principles may also be combined. For 
example, environmental impacts such as carbon 
emissions are typically considered over the long 
term and as they affect future generations.  
We can describe this revised view of the firm’s 
responsibilities as follows, taking these claims into 
account:  
 
A centre of value creation bounded by bounded 
by F  
and a maximal or minimal view of L; 
and a further set of extended principles 
including a stakeholder principle (SH), an 
environmental principle (EN), a long term 
principle (LT), a specific extended principle (SE), 
and other principles; where each extended 
principle may be refined further, for example, 
SH into a human rights principle (HR) and a 
community development principle (CD); and 
where extended principles may be combined  
 
We can simplify and generalise this view of the 
firm by grouping all further principles together as a 
set of extended principles (E). We can then refine the 
model of the firm as:  
 
A centre of value creation bounded by F  
and a minimal or maximal view of L; 
and extended principles (E)8  
                                                          
7 In both cases these principles (HR and CD) suggest 
limitations to the idea of preferences; so, an idea of rights 
may be relevant independent of an individual’s revealed 
or articulated preferences. On one view there may also be 
a conflict between rights, real interests and preferences. 
My thanks to Nigel Laurie for raising this issue.  
8 There may be a connection between this extension of the 
standard model in statement (1) and at least one aspect of 
the argument developed by Colin Mayer in Firm 
Commitment, Oxford, 2013. In his, ‘critique and celebration 
of the corporation’ (p241), Mayer suggests, ‘three 
straightforward adaptations of current arrangements’, 
which are, ‘establishing corporate values, permitting the 
creation of a board of trustees as their custodians, and 
allowing for time dependent shares’ (p247). These 
adaptations combine to create what Mayer describes as the 
‘trust firm’. It is important to point out that he stresses the 
need for, ‘diversity of ownership and governance 
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This can be simplified as: 
 
3. A centre of value creation bounded by F  
and a minimal or maximal view of L; 
and E 
 
An extended view of corporate responsibilities 
such as that described in (3) is subject to imprecise 
and emerging views about what constitutes the 
extended principles that bind the firm. The firm 
conceptualised as a centre of value creation 
bounded by the two principles F and L can be 
relatively clearly defined. As discussed above, F is 
relatively informal and indeterminate in the sense 
that some preferences are unknown; however, once 
preferences are revealed and customers buy 
products a financial return can be calculated. L is 
relatively formal and will vary across jurisdictions; 
however, legislation is explicitly codified, and is 
created, interpreted and enforced by legislative and 
judicial institutions.  
In order to operationalize extended principles 
(E), firms need to determine at least the following: 
clear definitions for each principle; standards by 
which actions and outcomes can be measured 
against these principles; and, sources of authority 
for these definitions and standards.  
Definitions and standards may be determined 
internally by the firm or externally beyond the firm. 
External sources are consistent with greater 
objectivity, but may not fully reflect the 
requirements of the firm. Internal sources may 
enable the firm to generate principles in areas where 
these principles are not currently available 
externally. Internal sources also suggest a greater 
requirement for the firm to engage in activities for 
which the firm may not be fully competent. 
One example of a broad set of external 
principles is the Millennium Development Goals 
backed by the institutional authority of the United 
Nations (UN)9. The Global Reporting Index (GRI)10 
may provide a more precise basis for specific actions 
and outcomes. These examples may be too general 
and wide ranging for a particular firm. Firms may 
seek more precise external guidance on specific 
principles. One example is human rights. This may 
include an appeal to the UN Declaration on Human 
Rights, and in particular the UN approach to 
business and human rights11. A further example is 
                                                                                        
structures’ of trust firms (p264). This summary this does 
not do justice to the range and complexity of the 
arguments in the book. However, it is possible that 
working through the conceptual implications of extending 
the principles that bind the firm, as in this paper, is one 
way of working out the kinds of ‘corporate values’ and 
other changes that Mayer has in mind.  
9 http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ 
10 https://www.globalreporting.org/Pages/default.aspx 
11 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/Business 
Index.aspx This is discussed in the UN document Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights included on the 
website. I think this is a good example of one attempt to 
integrate an ‘extended principle’, as described in this 
paper, into business practice. This is a complex issue and 
as the UN document states, ‘These Guiding Principles 
should be understood as a coherent whole and should be 
read, individually and collectively, in terms of their 
objective of enhancing standards and practices with 
regard to business and human rights so as to achieve 
the appeal to the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), also backed by the UN, for a 
principle covering carbon emissions12. National and 
international governmental sources may be 
supported or supplemented by guidance from 
recognised non-governmental organisations, such as 
Amnesty International in the case of human rights. 
The authority of these sources of guidance may be 
contested. 
The firm may generate internal extended 
principles through, for example, a code of ethics or a 
sustainability charter. Internal sources may in turn 
draw on external sources as further support for 
these principles. The firm may also submit itself to 
external auditing of its internal principles, and of 
the actions and outcomes that these extended 
principles cover. Audits may follow a similar process 
to the legally required audits that form the basis for 
the financial reports and accounts.  
Internal and external sources of definitions and 
standards are means by which the firm can define 
and operationalize potentially open ended principles 
suggested by an extended view of corporate 
responsibility.  
                                                                                        
tangible results for affected individuals and communities, 
and thereby also contributing to a socially sustainable 
globalization. Nothing in these Guiding Principles should 
be read as creating new international law obligations, or as 
limiting or undermining any legal obligations a State may 
have undertaken or be subject to under international law 
with regard to human rights.’ With this in mind, it useful 
to consider one principle: ‘Business enterprises should 
respect human rights. This means that they should avoid 
infringing on the human rights of others and should 
address adverse human rights impacts with  which they 
are involved.’ The commentary on this principle suggests 
that, ‘The responsibility to respect human rights is a global 
standard of expected conduct for all business enterprises 
wherever they operate. It exists independently of States’ 
abilities and/or willingness to fulfil their own human 
rights obligations, and does not diminish those 
obligations. And it exists over and above compliance with 
national laws and regulations protecting human rights. 
Addressing adverse human rights impacts requires taking 
adequate measures for their prevention, mitigation and, 
where appropriate, remediation.’ 
12 http://www.ipcc.ch/ The issue of carbon emissions is an 
example of both the availability of, and the complexity 
involved in, external guidance on specific principles. The 
most recent IPCC report Climate Change 2013: the Physical 
Science Basis appears to have provoked considerable 
controversy. At the same time, two of Headline Statements 
from the Summary for Policymakers from the IPCC website 
state that, ‘Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, 
and since the 1950s, many of the observed changes are 
unprecedented over decades to millennia. The atmosphere 
and ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice 
have diminished, sea level has risen, and the 
concentrations of greenhouse gases have increased’ and 
that, ‘Human influence has been detected in warming of 
the atmosphere and the ocean, in changes in the global 
water cycle, in reductions in snow and ice, in global mean 
sea level rise, and in changes in some climate extremes. 
This evidence for human influence has grown since AR4. 
It is extremely likely that human influence has been the 
dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-
20th century.’ http://www.un.org/climatechange/blog/ 
2013/09/27/headline-statements-from-the-summary-for-
policymakers/  
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A further model of the firm may then be 
refined as:  
 
4. A centre of value creation bounded by F  
and a minimal or maximal view of L;  
and E; 
with internal and/or external definitions, 
standards and authority for E13 
On this view, the actions and outcomes of the 
firm are bounded by a wider range of principles than 
F and L. For these principles to be operationalized 
they must enter into the reasons for acting of 
individuals within the firm, and for these reasons to 
inform the decisions and actions taken by these 
individuals.  
Principles L and F may be incorporated into 
reasons for acting in the following way. Reasons 
must be legal and, if legal, must enhance the 
potential financial return for the firm. The 
interpretation of legality and projections of financial 
return may be disputed, and legal and financial 
principles may interact and inform each other in 
complex ways. However, as a minimum L and F set 
the boundaries of the firm’s actions and outcomes.  
Extended principles (E) make this situation 
more complex, even where internal or external 
definitions, standards and sources of authority have 
been established. Resolving this complexity will 
require clarity across at least two linked dimensions: 
prioritisation and decision criteria. 
Prioritisation involves the ordering of 
principles as the basis for reasons for acting. L and F 
may be ordered in the following way. All actions 
must be legal within an idea of the rule of law, so L 
has priority over F. The question arises whether the 
firm places E (or one of the specific principles within 
E) as a priority over L and F, or as subordinate to L 
                                                          
13 One attempt to provide a systematic basis for one example 
of the kinds of  ‘extended principles’ suggested may be 
found in John Gerard Ruggie, Just Business, Norton, 2013. 
This book provides a valuable account of the thinking 
behind Ruggie’s work on the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights.  Ruggie finds that the debate 
on business and human rights, ‘pitted “mandatory” 
approaches against “voluntary” ones’ and had, ‘induced 
policy stalemate at the international level.’ (p78). Ruggie 
argues that, ‘the overriding lesson I drew from the 
assessment of the two approaches was that a new 
regulatory dynamic was required.’ (p78) He argues that 
the, ‘The Protect, Respect and Remedy (Framework) and 
the Guiding Principles (GPs) for its implementation aim to 
establish a common global normative platform and 
authoritative policy guidance as a basis for cumulative 
step-by-step progress without foreclosing any other 
promising longer term developments.’ (p81) The Respect 
element of the Framework provides the basis for a 
corporate responsibility and so could perhaps be seen as 
an ‘extended principle’. Ruggie provides the following 
description, ‘Let me sum up how I conceptualized the 
corporate responsibility to respect human rights. It exists 
independently of and yet complements the state duty to 
protect. It is defined in terms of the classic human rights 
meaning of respect: noninfringement on the rights of 
others, and addressing harms that do occur. Its 
substantive content consists of internationally recognised 
human rights. And its scope follows from its definition: 
actual or potential adverse human rights impacts by an 
enterprise’s own activities or through the relationships 
connected to those activities.’ (p100) 
and F. For example, a human rights principle (HR) as 
part of E could have priority over L if it requires 
actions that exceed minimum legal requirements, 
but are consistent with these requirements.  
When the range of principles binding the firm 
have been prioritised it will be necessary for the firm 
to establish explicit criteria for the appeal to each 
principle when an individual is forming reasons for 
acting and making decisions, including where 
principles are determined to have equal priority. For 
example, a human rights principle (HR) may have 
priority over L and F, or two environmental 
principles (say on carbon emissions and biodiversity) 
may have equal priority, but may both be 
subordinate to HR, L and F.  
Decision criteria will include prioritisation, but 
will also provide a detailed account of what the 
principle involves and how the principle can be 
applied to specific cases that are relevant to the 
firm’s operations.  
The model of the firm can then be refined as: 
 
A centre of value creation bounded by F  
and a maximal or minimal view of L;  
and E;  
with internal and/or external definitions, 
standards and authority for E;  
with all principles prioritised and with 
decision criteria for these principles 
 
Prioritisation may determine the degree to 
which the firm can be described as extending 
corporate responsibility beyond the standard model. 
A minimal view suggests further principles that bind 
the firm but which are subordinate to L and F, even 
if the further principles are considered significant. A 
maximal view suggests that L and F are subordinate 
to E, or to a principle or principles within E.  
We can refine two further versions of the model 
of the firm as:  
 
a. A centre of value creation bounded by F  
and a maximal or minimal view of L;  
and a minimal view of E;  
with internal and/or external definitions, 
standards and authority for E;  
with E as significant but subordinate to L and 
F;  
with all other principles prioritised and with 
decision criteria for these principles 
 
b. A centre of value creation bounded by F  
and a maximal or minimal version of L;  
and a maximal view E;  
with internal and/or external definitions, 
standards and authority for E;  
with L and/or F subordinate to E or a part of 
E;  
with all other principles prioritised and with 
decision criteria for these principles 
 
(a) and (b) may be combined as: 
 
5. A centre of value creation bounded by F  
and a minimal or maximal view of L; 
and a minimal or maximal view of E;  
with internal and/or external definitions, 
standards and authority for E;  
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with all principles prioritised and with 
decision criteria for these principles14 
 
One view of corporate responsibility may 
suggest that only (b) above presents a view of the 
firm that is significantly different from the standard 
model as described in (1). On this view (a) shows 
that the firm is bounded by F and L, and that only 
after its actions and outcomes are determined by 
these principles are further principles (E) appealed 
to as reasons for acting. However, if E is considered 
significant and demanding then both minimal and 
maximal views of E can be considered as extensions 
of corporate responsibility.  
One concern about minimal views of corporate 
responsibility is that if E is subordinate to L and F it 
will not, in fact, have any significant impact on 
reasons for acting and on the firm’s actions and 
outcomes.  
A further concern is that E is only appealed in 
cases where it supports L and F and does not 
operate as an independent principle. For example, 
aspects of E may be expressed in the preferences of 
investors or customers, so appeal to E collapses into 
a sophisticated appeal to F. Or, aspects of E may 
suggest emerging or potential changes to L, so 
appeal to E collapses into a strategic and 
anticipatory appeal to L, even if in advance of 
current requirements under L.  
To take these concerns into account, the model 
of the firm can be refined as:  
 
6. A centre of value creation bounded by F  
and a minimal or maximal view of L; 
and a minimal or maximal view of E;  
with internal and/or external definitions, 
standards and authority for E;  
                                                          
14 In a wide ranging analysis, David Vogel in The Market for 
Virtue, Brookings, 2006, reaches the broad conclusion that 
the direct impact of corporate responsibility on the 
activities and impact of firms is limited. Vogel cites a 
number of examples of impacts, but these are greatly 
outweighed by other factors. This would suggest that most 
firms most of the time are bound by principle L and F, 
with aspects of E affecting firms in specific situations and 
usually as a subordinate principle. Vogel’s analysis also 
suggests that E appears to collapse into F where it has an 
impact on for example corporate reputation. This view is 
summed up in a discussion of the problems with the 
business case for CSR, ‘We are now in a better position to 
explain why the numerous studies that seek to correlate 
corporate financial and social performance have produced 
such inconclusive results. One reason is that the social and 
environmental practices of the vast majority of companies 
have not had any demonstrated effects on their sales. Nor 
have their responses to civil regulation affected their 
ability to hire and retain motivated an competent 
employees. Most critically, remarkably few firms have 
been rewarded or punished by the financial markets for 
their social performance. And those few that have are not 
sufficiently numerous or important to affect the results of 
statistical studies that correlate corporate virtue with 
financial performance. Of the myriad factors that affect 
corporate earnings, CSR remains, for most firms most of 
the time, of marginal importance. Nonetheless it is clear 
that even if the bottom-line costs and benefits of CSR are 
difficult to measure and are rarely material to investors, 
many firms act as if CSR matters. How can we account for 
this?’ (p73, italics in original) 
with all principles prioritised and with decision 
criteria for these principles;  
where E or a part of E operates as an 
independent principle that does not collapse into 
versions of F and L 
 
The analysis so far may suggest changes to the 
overall role of the firm as a social and economic 
institution (we can summarise this as the role of the 
firm). A minimal view of E described in (a) above and 
included in (6) supports the view that even small 
changes in the basis upon which the firm operates 
are of interest, and that these changes may suggest a 
revised model of the firm. A maximal view of E 
described in (b) provides grounds for suggesting a 
revised model of the firm. Any such change to the 
basis upon which the firm operates suggests at least 
some change to the role of the firm.  
The standard model in (1) limits the role of the 
firm to value creation bounded by F and L. From the 
point of view of the firm this may provide a practical 
description of the firm’s actions and outcomes. 
However, from the point of view of the local and 
global community within which the firm operates, 
this role may also include a wider recognition of the 
utility of all firms operating on an individual basis of 
value creation bounded by F and L. For example, F 
generates wealth and L sustains the rule of law, and 
both F and L may support wider principles such as 
freedom and autonomy. This recognition may in 
turn be reflected in the firm’s view of its social and 
economic role.  
So, a narrow view of the role of the firm may be 
limited to a direct appeal to F and L, with no 
reference to claims about utility. A wide view of this 
role may appeal to F and L, but with an explicit 
reference to F and L as sustained by claims about 
utility. 
An extended view of corporate responsibility 
may suggest that some aspects of a wide view are 
internalised by the individual firm. A minimal view 
of the role may now incorporate the wide view of 
value creation, and make an explicit appeal to claims 
about the utility of F and L. A maximal view of the 
role may make this appeal, and also make claims 
about the utility of E or part of E. 
The model of the firm can be further refined 
as: 
 
7. A centre of value creation bounded by F  
and a minimal or maximal view of L; 
and a minimal or maximal view of E;  
with internal and/or external definitions, 
standards and authority for E;  
with all principles prioritised and with decision 
criteria for these principles;  
where E or a part of E operates as an 
independent principle that does not collapse into 
versions of F and L;  
where the role of the firm appeals to the 
utility of F and L (minimal view), or to the utility of 
F, L and E or part of E (maximal view) 
 
This model of the firm describes aspects of 
responsibility that extend beyond the boundaries of 
the firm described in (1). However, it may be argued 
that even in (7) any direct responsibility for the 
firm’s actions and outcomes is located primarily 
within the boundaries of the firm suggested by (1). 
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On this view, the further responsibilities suggested 
by, for example, E or by wider views of utility do 
extend beyond these boundaries but refer primarily 
to the more or less direct actions and outcomes of 
the firm.  
Further responsibilities for a firm’s actions and 
outcomes that are clearly beyond the boundaries 
suggested by (1) may involve responsibilities for the 
firm’s supply chain (or supply network). One view of 
a responsibility for an aspect of the supply chain is a 
firm taking responsibility for at least some of the 
actions and outcomes of a supplier to that firm 
where the supplier is a legal entity distinct from the 
original firm. The legal separation will include a 
distinction between employees and contractors, and 
between in-house and out-sourced activities. A 
definition along these lines may also be used to 
consider responsibilities for partners and other 
collaborators, and for customers of the firm. We will 
consider suppliers at this stage.  
We can identify three initial dimensions of 
supply chain responsibility, although this is not an 
exhaustive or comprehensive account. The content 
of these potential responsibilities may be similar to, 
and may overlap with, E.  
First, the foundations of supply chain 
responsibility are based on building reliable 
knowledge of the supply chain through mapping and 
analysis. This will establish the provenance of 
supplied products, for example raw materials or 
components, through multiple supply chain tiers. It 
will also provide a basis for understanding the 
actions and outcomes of all suppliers across these 
tiers. We can describe this first dimension as supply 
chain knowledge. 
Second, the nature of the relationship between 
the firm and the supplier, and the type of supplier, 
may vary widely and involve very different potential 
responsibilities. For example, the relationship 
between two firms of similar size that originate and 
operate in the same developed economy, that each 
have other significant customers and suppliers, and 
that are co-located, is very different to the 
relationship between a powerful firm in a developed 
economy and a smaller and financially weaker 
supplier from an emerging and geographically 
distant economy. We can describe the former as a 
peer supplier and the latter as a dependent supplier 
with a spectrum of types of relationship in between, 
recognising that this spectrum does not exhaust the 
complex range of relationships. We can describe this 
second dimension as supply chain visibility. 
Third, the firm may engage in various of types 
of management activity to discharge even minimal 
supply chain responsibility including: providing 
public information about the supply chain possibly 
including some analysis of the actions and outcomes 
of suppliers; developing supplier relationships; and, 
in depth investigation of supplier actions and 
outcomes along similar lines to those deployed by 
the firm to investigate its own actions and 
outcomes. The latter example may include 
independent monitoring of supply chain activities, 
certification of suppliers and supplied products, and 
decisions made by the firm to cease working with 
suppliers that do not meet standards. We can 
describe this third dimension as supply chain 
management.  
With this discussion of supply chains in mind, 
the model of the firm can be refined as: 
 
8. A centre of value creation bounded by F  
and a minimal or maximal view of L; 
and a minimal or maximal view of E;  
with internal and/or external definitions, 
standards and authority for E;  
with all principles prioritised and with decision 
criteria for these principles;  
where E or a part of E operates as an 
independent principle that does not collapse into 
versions of F and L;  
where the role of the firm appeals to the utility 
of F and L (minimal view), or to the utility of F, L and 
E or part of E (maximal view); 
where the firm establishes supply chain 
knowledge as a basis for supply chain visibility of 
peer suppliers (minimal supply chain 
responsibility), or supply chain management of all 
peer and distant suppliers (maximal supply chain 
responsibility)  
 
The model of the firm considered so far refers 
primarily (although not exclusively) to 
responsibilities for the actions and outcomes 
involved in the creation of products. We can also 
consider the firm’s responsibilities for the use of 
revenue and profit generated by the sale of these 
products. We will consider two dimensions in the 
first instance: payment of tax, and the distribution 
of revenue and profit. 
On the issue of tax, a firm may develop 
approaches across a spectrum from a maximal 
approach to paying tax to legitimate authorities, to a 
minimal approach based on complex measures to 
reduce or avoid payment of tax. For this analysis 
‘tax’ refers primarily to taxes on profits (for 
example, corporation tax) but may include other 
taxes as well (for example, value added tax).  
We can assume for this argument that the firm 
is based on at the least standard model in (1) and so 
the approach it adopts remains within L. The 
standard model suggests that the firm may choose 
to maximise F while operating within a minimal 
interpretation of L.  
The question of tax avoidance arises because of 
the complexity of L as it applies to tax liabilities and 
to the legitimate company structures that may 
maximise or minimise these liabilities. This is a 
complex issue within a single jurisdiction. It 
becomes more complex because of the variations in 
L across jurisdictions, the multiple jurisdictions that 
multinational companies operate across, and the 
multiple legitimate structures that these companies 
may adopt. The responsibility to be prepared to pay 
some tax is typically included in the content of 
principle L, even if L in fact requires the payment of 
no tax in some circumstances. 
We can link the payment of tax to E. For 
example, the firm may seek to maximise the 
payment of tax as a means of distributing profits to 
public authorities that may, in general, pursue E or 
part of E through public policy. Elements of E are 
likely to provide the environment of institutions and 
infrastructure for the firm’s activities and its ability 
to create value, for example through the provision of 
a legal system, transport networks and an educated 
workforce.  
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In some circumstances payment of tax may 
support democratic government or emergent 
democratic governments and so meet further 
elements of E. This may form part of the wider 
analysis of jurisdictions within which a firm may 
seek to invest, in this case as an analysis of the uses 
tax revenues. This may inform the firm’s decisions 
about investment. The implications of these links to 
principle E can be developed further. 
The complexity of corporate taxation means 
that it is difficult to calculate how much tax a firm 
has a responsibility to pay. One way to work through 
this issue is for the firm to create an explicit policy 
position on taxation that would include amongst 
other elements: an interpretation of the relevant 
parts of L; how profit is calculated; the reasons for 
various company accounting practices and 
structures; and, how these elements apply across 
multiple jurisdictions. An addition to the policy 
position could include an estimate of the proportion 
of overall profit to be paid in tax, however, this may 
be difficult to estimate and will, in turn, depend on 
how profits are calculated. An explicit policy 
position on tax would enable the firm to provide a 
public justification for taxes that are paid, even 
though on this basis the actual amount of tax paid 
by any firm remains open. 
The model of the firm may then be refined as: 
 
9. A centre of value creation bounded by F  
and a minimal or maximal view of L; 
and a minimal or maximal view of E;  
with internal and/or external definitions, 
standards and authority for E;  
with all principles prioritised and with decision 
criteria for these principles;  
where E or a part of E operates as an 
independent principle that does not collapse into 
versions of F and L;  
where the role of the firm appeals to the utility 
of F and L (minimal view), or to the utility of F, L and 
E or part of E (maximal view); 
where the firm establishes supply chain 
knowledge as a basis for supply chain visibility of 
peer suppliers (minimal supply chain responsibility), 
or supply chain management of all peer and distant 
suppliers (maximal supply chain responsibility);  
with an explicit policy position on taxation, 
showing how company structures and accounting 
practices have been arrived at, with reference to L 
and possibly to elements of E 
 
The second issue identified above is the 
distribution of revenue and profit. The firm will 
decide on the payments made to employees, 
shareholders, suppliers, and other commercial 
stakeholders based, as a minimum, on a 
combination of L and F in the standard model in (1).  
The firm may decide to develop further 
principles supported by processes and structures to 
operationalize the financial support for some of the 
principles within E. We can make a distinction 
between internal and external distribution of 
revenue and profit.  
The principles for determining the distribution 
of revenues and profits internally within the firm, in 
particular to employees and owners, may include: 
minimum incomes; benefits such as holidays, health 
insurance and maternity/paternity leave; profit 
sharing; ratios of lowest to highest remuneration; 
executive remuneration; levels and criteria for bonus 
payments; and, policies on redundancy. We can 
describe these as internal distribution principles. 
The firm may distribute profits externally to 
specific institutions or to support specific activities. 
This includes discretionary giving through 
sponsorship, charitable donations or non-
commercial or partially commercial investment. This 
may be institutionalised as a structural feature of 
the firm based on a tithe principle or equivalent. A 
further development of this approach may include 
the distribution of a defined proportion of profits to 
a Trust or equivalent institutional arrangement set 
up by the firm but independent of the firm’s 
financial interests. The Trust disperses funds to 
support external institutions or activities.  
We can combine these examples and refine the 
model of the firm as: 
 
10. A centre of value creation bounded by F  
and a minimal or maximal view of L; 
and a minimal or maximal view of E;  
with internal and/or external definitions, 
standards and authority for E;  
with all principles prioritised and with decision 
criteria for these principles; 
where E or a part of E operates as an 
independent principle that does not collapse into 
versions of F and L;  
where the role of the firm appeals to the utility 
of F and L (minimal view), or to the utility of F, L and 
E or part of E (maximal view); 
where the firm establishes supply chain 
knowledge as a basis for supply chain visibility of 
peer suppliers (minimal supply chain responsibility), 
or supply chain management of all peer and distant 
suppliers (maximal supply chain responsibility);  
with an explicit policy position on taxation, 
showing how company structures and accounting 
practices have been arrived at, with reference to L 
and possibly to elements of E;  
where structures and processes for the 
internal and external distribution of profits and 
revenues have been established, and may 
operationalize financial support for E 
 
This model of the firm suggests some changes 
to the ways in which the firm operates. In order for 
the firm to operate on a minimally revised basis 
some internal firm changes may be required to 
support individuals as they make decisions that 
operationalize aspects of the revised model.  
This may be particularly relevant in market 
environments where other firms are operating on the 
basis of the standard model of the firm described in 
(1). The competitive requirements for operating in 
such markets may make it difficult to sustain a 
revised view of the firm if this is not supported by 
structural and process changes within the firm. The 
following suggests a series of potential changes. As 
with the examples of extended principles, this is not 
exhaustive and other changes may be identified. 
First, the firm’s Board, executives and other 
senior managers will need an opportunity to discuss 
and agree the implementation of the revised model 
of the firm. This will include any further corporate 
responsibilities, the principles upon which these 
responsibilities are based, and any prioritisation and 
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decision criteria involved. These principles will 
inform the strategic reasons for acting of senior 
managers. 
Second, any revised strategic reasons for acting 
may require shareholder and other investor support. 
In some cases this may be a legal requirement to 
ensure that the firm’s managers are fulfilling their 
fiduciary duties to shareholders. It may be argued 
that all changes to the responsibilities of the firm 
will eventually require changes to L if these changes 
are to become a stable and sustainable part of the 
firm’s operations. This issue can be developed 
further.15  
Third, all employees and other relevant staff 
will need an opportunity to discuss and understand 
the implementation of the revised model of the firm 
and the further responsibilities and principles that 
this involves. This will inform the operational 
reasons for acting for all staff, including the senior 
managers identified above.  
Fourth, processes and structures within the 
firm will require changes in order to be consistent 
with, and supportive of, a revised model of the firm. 
The standard model of value creation in (1) is 
supported by a range of complex processes designed 
to support the firm’s actions and outcomes bounded 
by L and F. An extended view of corporate 
responsibility may require revised processes 
bounded in part by E and other aspects of the 
revised model. 
The changes discussed support a refined model 
of the firm, but also form part of that refined view, 
as:  
 
11. A centre of value creation bounded by F  
and a minimal or maximal view of L; 
and a minimal or maximal view of E;  
with internal and/or external definitions, 
standards and authority for E;  
with all principles prioritised and with decision 
criteria for these principles;  
where E or a part of E operates as an 
independent principle that does not collapse into 
versions of F and L;  
where the role of the firm appeals to the utility 
of F and L (minimal view), or to the utility of F, L and 
E or part of E (maximal view); 
where the firm establishes supply chain 
knowledge as a basis for supply chain visibility of 
peer suppliers (minimal supply chain responsibility), 
or supply chain management of all peer and distant 
suppliers (maximal supply chain responsibility);  
with an explicit policy position on taxation, 
showing how company structures and accounting 
practices have been arrived at, with reference to L 
and possibly to elements of E;  
where structures and processes for the internal 
and external distribution of profits and revenues 
have been established, and may operationalize 
financial support for E;  
where strategy, shareholder/investor support, 
operations, and processes are consistent with a 
revised model of the firm  
 
The changes above are suggested to enable a 
firm to operate on even a minimally revised basis. It 
may be difficult to sustain these changes in a market 
                                                          
15 Thanks to Nigel Laurie for raising this issue 
context in which other firms, including competitors, 
are operating on the basis of the standard model in 
(1).  
If these changes result in a positive change in F 
then even in a market context based on the standard 
model, the firm may be in a position to sustain 
operating on a revised basis. In this case, changes in 
customer and investor preferences suggest that the 
firm is in fact operating on the basis of (1), but with 
changes to F and in some cases the expectation of 
future changes to L. 
If the changes do not result in a positive 
change in F, or are difficult to sustain for other 
reasons, the firm may seek to change the market 
context itself.16 We can identify two broad 
approaches through which this may be achieved, 
although other approaches are possible. 
First, the firm may support or develop 
voluntary market or industry standards. For these to 
be effective they will require the support of all or 
most firms within a market or industry sector, and 
across all or most jurisdictions in which these firms 
operate. As a minimum, this is likely to include the 
support of the largest and most significant firms in 
the market or industry on the basis that smaller 
firms may follow. The most effective standards 
would cover all markets and sectors and be 
endorsed by all relevant firms. Standards of this 
kind may be developed in collaboration with 
national governments, international governmental 
organisations, and recognised non-governmental 
organisation such as those discussed in the context 
of external sources of authority for E. These 
standards may incorporate aspects of public policy 
but in this context are distinct from legislation and 
regulation derived from legislation, and so are not 
included as part of L.17  
Second, firms may work to change L and to 
change aspects of F in part through changes to L. 
These changes may include some of the areas 
discussed above and can be summarised as aspects 
of E. Firms may seek to make changes to L in a 
single or a group of jurisdictions or may seek to 
change aspects of international law or articles 
considered similar to international law such as 
treaties and global agreements. The impact of these 
changes in multiple national jurisdictions, in groups 
of jurisdictions, or internationally may be sufficient 
to change L for most firms.  
This approach will require significant 
investment by the firms involved. Firms may have 
developed experience of influencing and 
participating in shaping L through lobbying activities 
aimed at improving the conditions for achieving F 
through changes to L. It may be argued that all 
changes to L as a result of lobbying directly to 
improve F, or to incorporate aspects of E in L, will 
have the effect of improving F in the long run. The 
                                                          
16 David Vogel argues for something like this approach, 
largely because he does not think that CSR has a had a 
significant effect on the responsibilities and activities of 
firms. He suggests that, ‘The important complementary 
relationship between civil and government regulation 
suggests that the definition of a responsible corporation 
needs to be expanded. Corporate responsibility should be 
about more than going “beyond compliance”; it must 
include efforts to raise compliance standards’. David 
Vogel The Market for Virtue, Brookings, 2006, p171 
17 This is sometimes referred to as soft law. 
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scope and limits of justified lobbying activity can be 
considered as part of an analysis of pluralist 
democracy, including the analysis of the scope and 
limits of firms as a legitimate interest group acting 
individually or collectively. We can describe the 
distinction between the two activities as follows. 
Firms seeking to change L to improve F can be 
described as lobbying. Firms seeking to change L in 
order to incorporate aspects of E can be described as 
engaging in public policy participation. This 
distinction becomes problematic where changes to L 
that incorporate E improve F in the long run.  
The criteria for public policy participation will 
need to be established. The distinction between this 
public policy participation and lobbying will from a 
central part of these criteria, and the criteria are 
likely to be demanding for firms. One route may be 
to use an idea of public reasoning.  
This suggest a further refinement to the model 
of the firm as: 
 
12. A centre of value creation bounded by F  
and a minimal or maximal view of L; 
and a minimal or maximal view of E;  
with internal and/or external definitions, 
standards and authority for E;  
with all principles prioritised and with decision 
criteria for these principles;  
where E or a part of E operates as an 
independent principle that does not collapse into 
versions of F and L;  
where the role of the firm appeals to the utility 
of F and L (minimal view), or to the utility of F, L and 
E or part of E (maximal view); 
where the firm establishes supply chain 
knowledge as a basis for supply chain visibility of 
peer suppliers (minimal supply chain responsibility), 
or supply chain management of all peer and distant 
suppliers (maximal supply chain responsibility);  
with an explicit policy position on taxation, 
showing how company structures and accounting 
practices have been arrived at, with reference to L 
and possibly to elements of E;  
where structures and processes for the internal 
and external distribution of profits and revenues 
have been established, and may operationalize 
financial support for E;  
where strategy, shareholder/investor support, 
operations, and processes are consistent with a 
revised view of the firm; 
where the firm supports or develops 
voluntary market or industry standards, and/or 
participates in changes to L, and where the latter 
meets the criteria for public policy participation 
 
Further potential corporate responsibilities 
may be identified and analysed, for example: 
 Establishing the criteria for public policy 
participation, possibly involving an idea of 
public reasoning 
 Further dimensions of E, including the use 
of various forms of personal information 
generated by social media and other forms 
of digital media, and the nature of 
advertising in particular as this relates to 
specific demographic groups 
 Consideration of whether particular 
questions of responsibility are raised by the 
actions and outcomes of banks and other 
financial institutions  
 Property ownership as this applies to share 
ownership, and wider questions about the 
public and the private 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The paper opens with a conceptual question: to what 
extent, if at all, do claims about corporate 
responsibility have implications for the idea of the 
firm. The analysis starts by suggesting a standard 
model of the firm as: a centre of value creation 
bounded by a financial principle (F) and a legal 
principle (L), described in the paper in (1). The 
standard model is revised by adding a series further 
responsibilities, each of which is discussed. These 
further responsibilities are combined as a refined 
model of the firm, described in the paper in (12).  
The analysis suggests that an extended view of 
corporate responsibility involves a refined model of 
the firm, as described in (12). This has both 
empirical and ethical implications. Empirical 
implications at the level of the firm include the 
extent to which individual firms in fact operate on 
the basis of the refined model, or on the basis of 
elements or adaptations of this model. Empirical 
implications at the level of markets include the 
overall impact on welfare and utility if some or all 
firms adopt this model, or elements or adaptations 
of this model.  
Ethical implications include the debate about 
whether there are reasonable grounds for firms to 
operate on the basis of the refined model, or 
elements and adaptations of this model. Reasonable 
grounds will take into account empirical 
implications including those suggested above. 
Ethical implications overlap with empirical 
implications if we consider how firms might operate 
in the future, based on principles generated by the 
firm itself or by public policy, regulation, and 
legislation.  
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